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An Anaphoric Account of Stage-Level Predicates 
Theodore B. Fernald 
Swarthmore College 
1 . Introduction' 
This paper presents evidence that discourse anaphora can be introduced by stage-
level predicates but not by individual-level predicates. A dyoamic account is developed 
which draws on unexplored asswnptions in Kratzer's (1989) proposal, in particular that the 
difference between individual- and stage-level predicates is a type-theoretic one. 'This type-
theoretic difference provides the added benefit of resolving a compositionality puzzle 
involving perceptual reports and augmented absolute adjuncts. 
2. Background 
The distinction between individual- and stage-level predicates (hereafter ILPs and 
SLPs) is evident in a wide variety of English sentence types. The existential construction 
in (1) and (2) (Milsark 1974) and perceptual reports in (3) and (4) show a contrast in 
grammaticality: 
(l) a. There were people sick. 
b. There were people drunk. 
c. There were doors open. 
(2) a. "There were people intelligent. 
b. *There were people tall. 
c. "There were doors wooden. 
(3) a. Martha saw a policemen available. 
b. 1 saw Sam tower over his friends. 
(4) a. "Martha saw a policemen intelligent. 
b. *1 saw Sam taller than his friends. 
• For valuable discussion of the Ideas in this paper I would like to thank Greg Carlson, Donka Farkas, 
Sheila Glasbey, Manfred Krifka, Gerhard Jaeger, Bill Ladusaw, Carlota Smith, and the participants of 
NELS. I alone arn responsible for any errors. 
© 1999by Theodore B. Fernald 
Pius Tarnaji, Masako Hirotani, and Nancy Hall (eds.l, NELS 29: 93-104 
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The examples in (1) and (3) contain SLPs and are grammatical; (2) and (4) contain ILPs 
and are ungrammatical Indefinite subjects also show a contrast in acceptability (Milsark 
1974). The SLPs in (5) are grammatical, and the aps in (6) are less acceptable: 
(5) a. Sm people were sick. 
b. A man was drunk. 
(6) a. nSm people were tall. (cf. Some of the people were tall.) 
b. ??A man was intelligent (cf. All men were intelligent.) 
Bare plural subjects (Carlson 1977), shown in (7), and the free and absolute adjuncts in (8-
13) (Stump 1985) show a contrast in interpretation between ILPs and SLPs: 
(7) a. People were clever in those days. 
G,[person(x)] I clever(x)] 
b. People were hungry. 
3x[person(x) & hungry(x)] or G,[person(x)] [hungry(x)] 
As seen above, only SLPs allow a bare plural subject to have an existential interpretation. 
(8) and (9) are examples of free adjuncts. The fIrst member of each pair has a SLP in the 
adjunct, and a kind of conditional interpretation is possible. This interpretation is not 
possible with the ILPs in the second member of each pair: 
(8) a. Standing on a chair, Lisa's head touches the ceiling. 
b. Having long legs, Lisa's head touches the ceiling. 
(9) a. Standing on a chair, John can touch the ceiling 
b. Having unusually long arms, John can touch the ceiling. 
The examples below contain augmented absolute adjuncts, as Stump (1985) called them. 
(10) and (11) contain SLPs and the conditional interpretation is possible, but (12) and (13) 
contain ILPs in the adjunct, and no conditional interpretation is possible: 
(10) a. With her hair braided, Jane reminds us of Mary. 
b. With her children asleep, Mary watches TV. 
c. With his work done, John goes straight to bed. 
(11) a. With the truck in fIrst gear, we would coast gently downhill. 
b. With her hair braided, Jane must resemble Mary. 
c. With the children asleep, Mary might watch TV. 
(12) a. With his mother being a doctor, John knows the way to the Med Center. 
b. With the water being a little cold, the children stay on the beach. 
c. With his arm being in a cast, Bill is not asked to participate. 
(13) a. With his mother being a doctor, John would know the way to the Med Center. 
b. With the water being a little cold, the children must stay on the beach. 
c. With his arm being in a cast, Bill might not be asked to participate. 
When adjuncts also show a contrast in interpretation (Carlson 1977, Farkas & 
Sugioka 1983, Kratzer 1989, de Hoop & de Swart 1989). Kratzer (1989) used (14b&c) to 
argue that (14a) is a violation of the prohibition against vacuous quantifIcation shown in 
(15). The fact that (14d) is acceptable is taken as evidence that SLPs have an implicit 
argument that aps do not have. 
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(14) a. *When Mary knows French, she knows it well. 
*0 [knows (Mary, French)] [knows well (Mary, French)] 
b. When a Moroccan knows French, she knows it well. 
0x[Moroccan(x) & knows (x, French)] [knows well (x, French)] 
c. When Mary knows a foreign language, she knows it well. 
Ox [foreign language(x) & knows (Mary, x)] [knows well (Mary ,x)] 
d. When Mary speaks French, she speaks it well. 
O,[speaks (Mary, French,I)] [speaks well (Mary, French, I)] 
e. *When Mary speaks French, she knows it well. 
. *O,[speaks (Mary, French)] [knows well (Mary, French)] 
(15) Prohibition against vacuous quantification (Kratzer 1989) 
95 
For every quantifier Q, there must be a variable x such that Q binds an occurrence 
of x in both its restrictive clause and its nuclear scope. 
Thus, Kratzer proposes the interpretations in (16b) and (17b) for the sentences in (16a) and 
(17a). 
(16) a. Manon is dancing. 
b. dancing(m, I) 
(17) a. Manon is a dancer. 
b. dancer (m) 
Kratzer's analysis is built entirely around a syntactic theory of argument structure. 
SLPs have a spatiotemporallocation as the external argument, forcing subjects of SLPs to 
be VP-intemal. The additional assumption that VP is the domain of existential closure 
allows this proposal to capture the basic facts about the interpretation of indefinite subjects 
very nicely. 
Completely uninvestigated in Kratzer's paper are the type-theoretic consequences of 
positing the logical representations in (16) and (17). (18) and (19) show Kratzer's 
argument structures along with the logical type of the predicate classes: 
(18) Stage-level predicates 
dance 
hit 
(19) Individual-level predicates 
be intelligent 
own 
Argument structure 
<location, agent> 
<location, agent, theme> 
<experiencer> 
<owner, owned> 
Type 
<l,<e,!» 
<e,<l,<e,t»> 
<e,!> 
<e,<e,!» 
This paper investigates some of the type-theoretic consequences of this proposal, 
focusing on the temporal portion of the spatiotemporal and ignoring the spatio part. I will 
show that this type-theoretic distinction can resolve a compositionality challenge posed by 
perceptual reports and absolute adjuncts and that the same basis for the ILP/SLP distinction 
can be used to provide an account of donkey anaphoric effects found with SLPs but not 
ILPs. 
3. Nonuniformity 
As I've argued elsewhere (Fernald in press), it is evident from the work of many 
researchers that the ILP/SLP distinction is due to several properties that overlap 
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substantially, but not perfectly. This paper focuses on one of those properties -- a 
correlation between SLPs and deictic and anaphoric uses of tense. The diagnostics for the 
ILP/SLP distinction are also affected by a plurality condition on generic quantification (see 
deHoop & de Swart 1989), issues of compositionality (Fernald in press), a specificity 
effect (Glasbey 1997, Fernald 1994, in press), coercion, and an inference of an 
interruption in the temporal interval over which an ILP is taken to hold of a subject 
(Schubert & Pelletier 1989, Krifka et al. 1995, Moens & Steedman 1988, Fernald 1994, 
1996, in press). In addition, it may be affected by distinction between thetic and 
categorical judgments (see Ladusaw 1994, McNally 1998). and other factors. 
4. The Deictic and Anaphoric Nature of SLPs 
Donkey sentences are a classical problem in semantics. Problems arise if indefinite 
nominals are interpreted as having their own existential quantifiers within their basic 
interpretations, as assumed in Montague, for example. Thus. (20a) cannot be interpreted 
as (21a) since the variable x in the expression beat (x,y) cannot be bound by the existential 
quantifier; and both variables in beat (x,y) in (21 b) are outside the scopes of the quantifiers. 
So the formulas in (21) are ill-formed, but if these variables were bound to any quantifiers 
with wider scope, incorrect interpretations would result. 
(20) a. 
b. 
(21) a. 
b. 
Every farmer who has a donkey beats it. (Geach 1962) 
If a farmer has a donkey, he beats it. 
+'</y [farmer (y) & 3x[donkey (x) & own (y,x)] ~ beat (y,x)]] 
+3y [farmer (y) & 3x[donkey (x) & own (y,x)]]~ beat (y,x) 
Strawson (1952) pointed out that the it in (22) is understood as referring to whatever dog 
was introduced in the first sentence, but that interpreting it as an ordinary variable will 
result in it being unbound since the scope of the existential quantifier introduced by a dog is 
confined to the formula corresponding to the sentence in which that nominal appears: 
(22) A dog came into the room. It flopped down. (Strawson 1952) 
3x [dog(x) & came-into-the-room (x)] flopped-down(x) 
A rich tradition in dynamic Montague semantics (Groenendijk & Stockhof 1990) and 
discourse representation theory (Kamp 1981) has arisen to account for these and related 
phenomena. There are many varieties of dynamic semantics. For concreteness, my 
proposal will assume one of the earliest and most widely available versions, that of 
Groenendijk & Stockhof (1990).1 
In Dynamic Semantics, utterances are interpreted as context change potential. In 
Dynamic Montague Grammar (DMG) this is formalized as a mapping from states to states, 
where a state is an assignment of values to discourse marlcers. Nominal expressions are 
interpreted using discourse markers rather than directly using variables. Lower case d 
indicates a discourse marker in the formulations below; {xld) is called a state-switcher 
which has the effect of assigning the value x to a discourse marker d. The definitions of 
DMG that are crucial for this paper are shown in (23-29). 
(23) Dynamic Existential Quantifier Edif> = Ap 3x [xld)(if>(P)). where x and p have no 
free occurrences in if>. 
(24) S.tatic Universal Quantifier rid if>= -Ed-if> 
I There are some well-known shortComings to this system of assumptions - see Chierchia (1992) for 
some of them. My proposal will naturally have the same shortcomings. but the purpose of this paper is to 
show that part of the analysis SLPs must involve the analysis of donkey anaphora. 
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(25) a. Uparrow i 1/1 = 'A.p [1/1" )], where 1/1 is an expression of type t, p a variable of 
type <.s, t> which has no free occurrences in 1/1. 
b. Downarrow t <II = <II ("true), where <II is an expression of type <<.s,t>,t>. 
(26) Static Negation -<II = i...,.j, <II 
(27) Dynamic Conjunction <II; 'I' = 'A.p [<II("('I' (P»)], where p has no free occurrences 
in either <II or '¥. 
(28) Sentence sequencing: 1/1. ljI is interpreted as 1/1' ; ljI' 
Restrictive relative clauses: a CN + /3s is interpreted as Ax[ a'(x); /31 (29) A crucial property of state switchers: (ald}(/3(Y) is equivalent with 
(ald}/3({ald}y) 
Sample basic expressions are shown below: 
(30) Basic expressions of DMG: 
farmer ~ Ax ifanner (x) 
walk ~ Ax i walk (x) 
~ ~ 'A.P 'A.Q &di ['P(di) ; ~Q(di)]' where di is novel 
everyi ~ 'A.P 'A.Q ~ ['P(di ) ~ ~Q(dj) ] 
fIOj ~ 'A.pf...Q~j ['P(dj) ~ -~Q(dj)] 
hei ~ 'A.QrQ(dj ) ], where dj is familiar 
Johnj ~ 'A.Q[{j1djrQ(dj)] 
These assumptions yield (3lb) as the interpretation of (3la). This formula is equivalent to 
(3lc) and (3Id). 
(31) a. Every fanner who has a donkey beats it. 
b. ~l [[ifanner (dl ) ; U2[ i donkey (d2) ; i own (d2)(dl )]] 
~ ibeat (d~(dl)] 
c. 'A.p '<Ix '<Iy (x/d l ) {yld2 )[farmer (d l ) & 3x[donkey (d2) & own (d2)(dl )] 
beat (d~ (dl)],,"P] 
d. 'A.p '<Ix '<Iy[fanner (x) & 3x[donkey (y) & own (y)(x)] 
-7 beat(y) (x)] ""P] 
To get the truth conditions for (3la), we can apply the down arrow operator to (3ld). This 
will result in the tautologous proposition saturating the formula in (3ld). 
Partee (1989), summarizing Bauerle (1979), von Stechow (1982), Hinrichs 
(1981), Partee (1973), and Cooper (1986), points out that temporal and locative implicit 
arguments behave like overt pronouns in having deictic, discourse anaphoric, and bound 
variable characteristics. Thus: 
(32) a. Deictic or demonstrative: Who's he? (partee 1989) 
b. Discourse anaphoric: A woman walked in. She sat down. 
c. Bound variable: Every man believed he was right. 
(33) a. Deictic past: Ididn't tum off the stove. (partee 1973) 
b. Discourse anaphoric past: Mary woke up sometime in the night. She turned on 
the light 
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c. "Bound variable" past: Whenever John wrote a letter to Mary, she answered 
two days later. 
Partee concludes that tense is like a pronoun. Significantly, none of the examples in 
Partee's work or the others cited bere involve ll..Ps. In fact, ll..Ps have none of these 
characteristics: 
(34) a. 
b. 
c. 
Sam was smart. 
Sam was a professor. He was altruistic. 
*Whenever Sam was a professor, he was altruistic. 
(34a) has a deictic use like (33a) only if the predicate is coerced into being stage-level 
through a pragmatic process I have elsewhere called Evidential Coercion2 (see Fernald 
1994, 1996, in press). On such a reading, was sl1UUt is taken to mean 'gave evidence at a 
spatiotemporal location of having the property denoted by the ll..P smart'. But the 
WlCOerced ll..P reading of (34a) is not deictic in the way that (33a) is. Similarly, the 
Wlcoerced readings for the (34b) lack the discourse anaphoric reading possible with the 
SLPs in (33b). Finally, (34c) bas the same status as (33c). These sentences usually 
appear in the literature with an ungramrnaticality star before them, although I usually think 
this is a bit too strong. I take it, however, that to the extent that (34c) is acceptable, it is not 
quantifying over event time, but the time at which the proposition in each clause is to be 
eValuated.3 All the sentences in (34) have tense in them, but they lack the similarity to 
pronouns of the examples in (33) which contain SLPs. We conclude that tense is not 
anaphoric or deictic except when it appears with SLPs. Dynamic semantics was designed 
to deal with cases of discourse and bound variable anaphora like (33b&c) .. Thus, an 
analysis needs to be developed in which SLPs have dynamically-interpreted implicit 
arguments. 
A significant consequence of this analysis will be that the implicit temporal 
arguments will be expected to pattern exactly with donkey anaphora. This prediction 
appears to be successful: 
(35) a. When a womani speakst French, sh~ speakst it well. (Kratzer 1989) 
b. A womani woket up sometime in the night. Shei turnedt on the light 
c. No on~ walked in. *H~ turned on the light. 
d. No one walkedt in. *Sam turnedt on the light. 
e. If a fanneri has a donkey, hei beats it. *Hei is upset. 
f. If a fanner hast a donkey, he beatst it *Robin is upsett about this. 
(35a) is a classical donkey sentence. (35b) shows that the implicit argument in the second 
sentence can pick up the discourse referent used in the first sentence. The temporal 
argument in the second sentence of (35c) cannot be interpreted as referring to locations of 
2 Below is my statement of Evidential Coercion: 
(i) Evidential Coercion: Let u be an ILP with interpretation u'. u can be used as a SLP with the 
following interpretation: 
AlJ M3Q [Q(x,~) & G,J(Q(y,I»[(u'(y»)) 
Other kinds of coercion are relevant to the ILP/SLP diagnostics as well. See Fernald (in press) for details. 
3 Tendencies to think that (34b) may involve a similar temporal reference I think also involve evaluation 
time rather than any coerced event time. I discuss this further in Fernald (in press). but there is room for 
further investigation. 
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walking in. This parallels the inability of the overt pronoun he in the second sentence of 
(35d) to pick up a referent from the fIrst sentence. 
Finally, consider the pair in (35e) and (350. (35e) shows that. while the 
conditional connective is internally dynamic, it is externally static. "That is, an indefinite 
description contained in the antecedent of a conditional introduces a discourse referent that 
can be picked up by an expression in the consequent (hence the connective in dynamic 
within the sentence in which it appears); but the referent cannot be picked up by any 
pronoun in a subsequent sentence (contrasting with the simple case in (35b» . Now we see 
in (350 that the temporal argument of SLPs works exactly the same way. (350 is an 
acceptable discourse, but not on an interpretation in which Robin's being upset coincides 
with each instance of a farmer seeing and beating a donkey. 
5. Proposal 
From the discussion above, I conclude that a dynamic analysis is needed for SLPs. 
Since it is a consequence of Kratzer (1989) that SLPs and ILPs are of differing logical 
type, I will propose that the extra spatioremporal argument of SLPs should be interpreted as 
a discourse marker the way pronouns are in dynamic semantics. In this analysis, I assume 
the type-theoretic distinction4 shown in (36) and (37): 
(36) Stage-level predicates 
dance 
hit 
(37) Individual-level predicates 
be intelligent 
own 
<l,<e,cc» 
<e,<l,<e,cc»> 
<e,cc> 
<e,<e,cc» 
These are the types implicitly assumed in Kratzer's analysis shown in (18) and (19) but 
with CC, the type of propositions in dynamic semantics (mnemonic for 'context change' -
see Chierchia 1992), in place of t. 
Variable Type 
x, y e 
p cc 
P,Q <S,<e,cc» ILP 
T, U 
, 
<s,<l,<e,cc»> SLP 
t. I 1 (a sort of type e) 
I assume that times are a sort of entity and so can be values for temporal sorts of discourse 
markers without adding any machinery to DMG. I further assume that tense is what 
introduces a temporal discourse marker (indicated by cl) that fills the extra argument 
position of SLPs. (38) and (39) illustrate this: 
(38) Simple deictic past;. ~ A.T A.x[T(d\)(x) ; A.p 3ta (~ < Is & d\ = ta &"p]] 
4 We could Just as easUy assume that I is the final argument to saturate the predicate and use <e,<l,ct:» as 
the type for intransitive SLPs. A few of the rules of composition would differ, but the two approaches are 
about equally simple. The one I show here is slighUy simpler. 
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(39) Simple anaphoric pas~ ~ 
AT Ax['T(dti)(x) & REL (dtj' d\) ; Ap 3tR [tR < IS & d\ = tR &'pJ], 
where d\ is novel and dtj is familiar. 
In (38) and (39), ts indicates speech time and is left free since it will be bound by context 
The reference time tR is bound by an existential quantifier. In illustrating this proposal, I 
assume that all tense and aspect information is available at a single syntactic node. 
Obviously there are complex issues involved in the composition of aspect and this proposal 
would ultimately need to be integrated into such a system. 
In this proposal, any object argument of a SLP composes with the predicate's head 
as its flrst argument Tense, if present, composes next, resulting in something of type 
<e,cc> which can then compose with the subject Small clauses, like the perceptual reports 
shown in (3) and (4), contain no tense so an additional composition rule is needed to allow 
the subject and predicate to compose: 
(40) Small Clause Composition 
a. Syntax. If a is of type <S,<<S,<e,cc»,CC» and 0 is of type <l,<e,cc», 
then f(a,o) is of type </,cc>. 
b. Semantics. If a is of type <s,<<S,<e,cc»,cc» and 0 is of type 
<l,<e,cc», and a and 0 translate into a' and 0' respectively, then f(a,o) 
translates into Al [a'{ Ao'(l))]. 
This results in the following interpretation for Robin saw John leave: 
(41) a. Robin saw John leave. 
b. Ap[see'(r, AI(leave(l)(j)], d') & 3tR [~ < IS & d' = tR & 'pJ] 
In such expressions, the event time of the perceived event (described in the small clause) is 
inherited from the event time of perception in the matrix clause. The following meaning 
postulate accomplishes this: 
(42) MP: For all a of type <<i,cc>,<l,<NP,cc»>, ~ of type e, "( of type <l,ce>, and 
o of type el' interpreted as a', W, y, and 0' respectively, [a' (W, y, 0') ~ 
a,' CW, reo'), 0')]. 
The formula below is the result of applying the meaning postulate to (40b): 
(43) Ap[see' (r, leave,(d')(j), d') & 3~ [tR < IS & d' == tR &-p]] 
My proposal, then is that SLPs are descriptions of temporal intervals and that 
discourse markers are associated with those intervals. The discourse referent that the SLP 
picks up can be introduced by discourse context, accommodation, or a dynamic adverb of 
quantiflcation. Not all SLPs in a discourse pick up exactly the same temporal referent For 
example, in Robin left the stare, went home, antijell asleep, there is at least an inference of 
a progression in event times. Hinrichs (1986) discusses these issues in detail, concluding 
with the following generalizations: 
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(44) The reference point of a discourse can be shifted by: 
(a) the Aktionsart of a main clause; accomplishments and achievements 
introduce new reference points, while states, activities and events described 
in the progressive do not 
(b) the use of temporal conjunctions. 
(c) the use of flexible anchoring adverbials and dependent adverbials . 
(Hinrichs 1986) 
Since SLPs can be either telic or atelic, the issue of shifting temporal reference is 
independent of the ILP/SLP issues. For this reason, my analysis finesses these issues 
using the relation REL in the interpretation of anaphoric past in (39). This is also the 
reason (39) includes two temporal discourse markers. Thus, SLPs combine the 
characteristic of a definite description, that picks up a previously established referent, with 
the ability of an indefinite to introduce a new referent 
So far I have not said much about tense with !LPs. Certainly ILPs occur in tensed 
clauses! I have claimed that tense is used to locate the event time of SLPs, but it cannot do 
the same thing for !LPs since !LPs, by assumption, do not have event time. Consistent 
with the discussion of (34) above, I propose that tense with !LPs serves to locate the time 
at which a propositional content of an utterence is to be evaluated. As before, I illustrate 
this with the simple past: 
(45) Sim pie pastn.p =:) 
6. Consequences 
The first consequence of this proposal is that we have an accowlt of the donkey 
effects involving SLPs: 
(46) a. A woman woke up. She turned on the light (=33b) 
b. AP [woman(x) & woke-up (d'l) (x) & 3ta[ta < Is & d\ = tR 
& turn-on-light (d';! (x) & REL (d\, d'2) & 3ta[tR < Is & d'z = ta & Vp] ] ] 
The second consequence is that we can provide a way out of a problem for 
compositionality with perceptual reports and augmented absolutes. Carlson's (1977) 
account of the ILP/SLP distinction was based on sorting the set of entities into stages, 
objects, and kinds, with the sort individual consisting of the union of the object and kind 
sorts. His account is thus built on the type-theoretic distinction below: 
(47) SLP 
ILP 
<e'1> 
.' 
<e',z> 
In Carlson (1977), perceptual reports are analyzed as having tripartite structures: 
(48) VP 
v--J;-xp 
More recent work in syntaX has argued that the NP and XP (the description of the 
perceived event) should be analyzed as a single constituent (Higginbotham 1983, Pollard & 
Sag 1994). But such an analysis is not possible with Carlson's type-assignment: it is easy 
to see that the distinction between !LPs and SLPs will be lost once the predicate composes 
with its subject argument 
9
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The type-theoretic distinction assumed in this paper provides a solution to this. 
Since SLPs have an extra temporal argument, the type-theoretic distinction remains evident 
until tense supplies the discourse marker to fill it We can provide the following type 
assignment to the perceptual report form of see and this allows it only to compose with 
small clauses that contain a SLP, as illustrated in (50):5 
(49) see «I,cc>,<I,<e,cc»> 
(50) V' * V' 
-----------
V SC </'ee> 
-----------
V SC <cc> 
I ~
see NP SLP <1,<e,cc» 
I ~
see NP ll..P <e,ce> 
/"-.... I /"-.... I 
a chair available a chair wooden 
Although I do not provide an account of the interpretations of augmented absolutes here 
(see Fernald in press), it is clear that some way is needed to distinguish between PPs that 
contain ILPs from those that contain SLPs (recall the contrast in interpretation they show in 
(10-11) and (12-13». My account provides such a mechanism: 
(51) CP 
---------------
PP CP 
~ /"-.... 
P SC <I,cc> 
~
NP SLP <1,<e,ce» 
CP 
---------------
PP CP 
~ /"-.... 
P SC <cc> 
~
NP ll..P <e,ce> 
A final consequence of this proposal (also a consequence of Kratzer 1989) is that time is 
used differently in propositions based on SLPs than it is in propositions based on ILPs. 
This is because time is a constituent within any SLP-based proposition but not within an 
ILP-based proposition. The chart in (52) indicates that sentences containing SLPs and 
ILPs both potentially correspond to different propositions depending on the time at which 
the sentence is uttered. However, how the different propositions are gotten potentially 
differs in the two cases. 
(52) Sentence Content Proposition 
----
SLP 
----
5 A NELS panicipant pointed out that see can take a full clause complement (Robin saw thaI the dishes 
had been washed / Robin saw thaI Pal was sman) and so the type «I,cC>,<e,cc» must also be available 
for it. The see in this sentence clearly does not involve direct perception, unlike the uses of see we have 
been discussing. I assume that the two are distinguished from each other in the lexicon since the version of 
see that entails direct perception cannot be used with a full clause complement 
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• 
ILP 
------- . 
I use the term content to pick out everything in a proposition except for its evaluation time. 
Since time is at issue within a SLP-based proposition, it must be fixed before the content is 
gotten. Thus, each SLP-based sentence potentially corresponds to multiple contents. For 
example, in identifying the content of the sentence Robin kicked the trashcan it is 
necessary to identify just what time the speaker is talking about Once this content is 
established, which proposition is expressed is already determined. ll.P-based sentences, on 
the other hand, do not have temporal arguments that need to be anchored before the content 
can be identified. Thus, Robin is tilIJ. expresses the same content regardless of when it is 
uttered. However, the time at which the content is evaluated yields multiple propositions 
for the single content uttering the sentence sometime in 1998 expresses a different 
proposition from uttering it in 1990. 
Finally, it should be evident if the event time argument in a SLP-based sentence is 
bound to an operator within the sentence, the result will have the temporal properties of 
ILP-based sentences. This is because the determination of the event time is not dependent 
on utterance context Clearly there are consequences to this that deserve further attention. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have observed stage-level predicates exhibiting the characteristics 
of donkey anaphora. Although the donkey effects with atemporal when adjuncts have been 
discussed repeatedly in the literature, I am not aware of any previous claims that SLPs 
exhibit the full range of donkey effects. The analysis presented here was based on 
unexplored assumptions of Kratzer (1989) which are largely independent of the main thrust 
of that paper. My account assumes a type-theoretic distinction between ILPs and SLPs in 
which the extra temporal argument of SLPs is filled by a discourse marker. This analysis 
provided a solution to the compositionality puzzle posed by perceptual reports and 
augmented absolute adjuncts. Finally, I briefly explored the temporal consequences of 
positing the distinction proposed here. 
References 
Bauerle, R. 1979. Temporale Deixis, temporale Frage. Gunter Marr. Tiibingen. 
Carlson, Gregory N. 1977. Reference to Kinds in English. Doctoral dissertation. 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst. published by Garland 1980. 
Carlson, Gregory N. 1982. 'Generic Terms and Generic Sentences'. Journal of 
Philosophical Logic 11 : 145-181. 
Carlson, Gregory N. and Francis Jeffry Pelletier, eds. 1995. The Generic Book, 1-124. 
University of Chicago. Chicago. 
Chierchia, Genarro. 1992. ' Anaphora and Dynamic Binding'. Linguistics & Philosophy 
15: 111-184. 
Cooper, Robin. 1986. Tense and discourse location in situation semantics'. Linguistics & 
Philosophy 9: 17-36. 
Diesing, Molly. 1992. Indefinites. MIT Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Fernald, Theodore B. 1994. On the Nonuniformity of the Individual- and Stage-level 
Effects. Doctoral Dissertation. UCSC. 
Fernald, Theodore B. 1996. 'Evidential Coercion'. Linguistic Society of America annual 
meeting, San Diego. 
11
Fernald: An Anaphoric Account of Stage-Level Predicates
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1999
104 Theodore B. Fernald 
Fernald, Theodore B. in press. Predicates and Temporal Arguments. Oxford University 
Press. Oxford. 
Geach, P. 1962. Reference and Generality. Cornell University Press. Ithaca, NY. 
G1asbey, Sheila. 1997. 'I-Level Predicates that Allow Existential Readings for Bare 
Plurals'. Proceedings from Semantics and Linguistic Theory VII. 
Groenendijk, Jeroen & Martin Stokhof. 1990. 'Dynamic Montague Grammar'. In L. 
Kalman and L. Po10s, eds. Papers from the Second Symposium on Logic and 
Language. Akademiai Kaid6. Budapest 
Higginbotham, James. 1983. The Logic of Perceptual Reports. An Extensional Alternative 
to Situation Semantics'. The Journal of Philosophy 80. 100-127. 
Hinrichs, Erhard. 1986. 'Temporal Anaphora in Discourses of English'. Linguistics & 
Philosophy 9: 63-82. 
de Hoop, Helen & Henriette de Swart 1989. 'Over indefinite objecten en de re1atie tussen 
syntaxis en semantiek'. Glot 12. 
Kamp, Hans. 1981. 'A Theory of Truth and Semantic Interpretation'. In J. Groenendijk et 
al., eds. Truth Interpretation and Infonnation. Foris. Dordrecht 
Kamp, Hans & Uwe Ry1e. 1993. From Discourse to Logic. Kluwer. Dordrecht 
Kratzer, Angelika. 1989. 'Stage-Level and Individual-Level Predicates.' In E. Bach, A. 
Kratzer, and B. Partee, eds. Papers on Quantification. University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst [Also in Carlson & Pelletier.] 
Krifka, Manfred, Francis Jeffry Pelletier, Gregory N. Carlson, Alice ter Meulen, Gennaro 
Chierchia, and Godehard Link. 1995. 'Genericity: An Introduction'. In Carlson & 
Pelletier. 
Ladusaw, William A 1994. 'Thetic and Categorical, Stage and Individual, Weak and 
Strong'. In Harvey, Mandy and Lynn Santelrnann, eds. Proceedings from 
Semantics and Linguistic Theory N. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. 
McNally, Louise. 1998. 'Stativity and Theticity.' In S. Rothstein, ed. Events and 
GrammLlr. 293-307. Kluwer. Dordrecht 
Milsark, Gary L. 1974. Existential Sentences in English. Doctoral Dissertation. MIT. 
Partee, Barbara H. 1984. 'Compositionality'. In Fred Landman & Frank Veltman, eds. 
Varieties of Formal Semantics, 281-311. Foris. Dordrecht 
Partee, Barbara H. 1989. 'Binding Implicit Variables in Quantified Contexts'. CLS 25: 
342-365. 
Pollard, Carl & Ivan A. Sag. 1994. Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar. University 
of Chicago. Chicago. 
Reichenbach, Hans. 1947. Elements of Symbolic Logic. Free Press. New York. 
(paperback edition published in 1966.) 
Schubert, Lenhart K. and Francis Jeffry Pelletier. 1989. Generically Speaking: Or, Using 
Discourse Representation Theory to Interpret Generics. In Chierchia, G., B. 
Partee, and R. Turner, eds., Properties, Types and Meaning voL2: Semantic 
Issues, 193-268. Kluwer. Dordrecht 
von Stechow, Amim. 1982. 'Three Local Deictics'. In R. Jarvel1a & W. Klein, eds. 
Speech, Place, and Action: Studies in Deixis and Related Topics. 73-99. John 
Wiley & Sons. New York. 
Stowell, Timothy A 1981. Origins of Phrase Structure. MIT. Doctoral Dissertation. 
Strawson, Peter. 1952. Introduction to Logical Theory. Methuen. London. 
Stump, Gregory T. 1985. The Semantic Variability of Absolute Constructions. Reidel. 
Dordrecht 
de Swart, Henriette E. 1991. Adverbs of Quantification: A Generalized Quantifier 
Approach. Doctoral dissertation. Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. 
Department of Linguistics 
Swarthmore College 
Swarthmore, PA 19081 tfernal1 @swarthmore.edu 
12
North East Linguistics Society, Vol. 29 [1999], Art. 8
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/nels/vol29/iss1/8
